Emory International Law Review
Volume 35

Issue 1

2021

Hong Kong's Civil Disobedience Under China's Authoritarianism
Shucheng Wang

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr

Recommended Citation
Shucheng Wang, Hong Kong's Civil Disobedience Under China's Authoritarianism, 35 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 21
(2021).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol35/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

WANG_2.9.21

2/10/2021 1:03 PM

HONG KONG’S CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE UNDER CHINA’S
AUTHORITARIANISM
Shucheng Wang∗
ABSTRACT
Acts of civil disobedience have significantly impacted Hong Kong’s liberal
constitutional order, existing as it does under China’s authoritarian
governance. Existing theories of civil disobedience have primarily paid
attention to the situations of liberal democracies but find it difficult to explain
the unique case of the semi-democracy of Hong Kong. Based on a descriptive
analysis of the practice of civil disobedience in Hong Kong, taking the Occupy
Central Movement (OCM) of 2014 and the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment
Bill (Anti-ELAB) movement of 2019 as examples, this Article explores the extent
to which and how civil disobedience can be justified in Hong Kong’s rule of lawbased order under China’s authoritarian system, and further aims to develop a
conditional theory of civil disobedience for Hong Kong that goes beyond
traditional liberal accounts. More specifically, it is argued that an act of civil
disobedience targeted at the actions of the central government, which has no
democratic accountability to the people of Hong Kong, is one aimed outside the
domain of Hong Kong’s autonomy, and is thus unlikely to succeed in the Hong
Kong context. By contrast, an act of civil disobedience intended to push against
the government of Hong Kong acting within its domain of autonomy largely fits
into Hong Kong’s semi-democratic system. Moreover, it is suggested that both
forms of civil disobedience have had significant utilitarian value as a civic
educational tool. Finally, this Article reconciles unlawful acts of civil
disobedience with Hong Kong’s rule of law by establishing clear limitations on
permissible conduct, with particular attention paid to non-violence as a
fundamental condition, albeit without excluding the use of limited forms of
violence as an appropriate strategy, e.g., to invigorate political participation, in
particular when available democratic and peaceful channels have been
exhausted.
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INTRODUCTION
Questions regarding the justification and ethics of civil disobedience have
long perplexed academics. It was even claimed that, after Martin Luther King Jr
was assassinated, civil disobedience was no longer relevant to life today and thus
likely to die out.1 However, it is very clear that this is not the case for Hong
Kong. For example, it is widely accepted that the Occupy Central Movement
(OCM) in 2013 was a civil disobedience movement in which leaders mobilized
protesters to stage a mass sit-in in order to blockade Hong Kong’s Central
District; the aim of this movement was to force Beijing to give the people of
Hong Kong what they demanded, namely genuine universal suffrage.2 In other
words, the OCM intended to pressure China’s Central Government into
withdrawing the framework it had proposed to govern the election of the Chief
Executive of Hong Kong. Instead it compelled it to adopt an electoral system
that was in accordance with international standards of universal suffrage with
respect to the civic nomination for the election of the Chief Executive.3
Furthermore, the ongoing Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (AntiELAB) movement has aimed to oppose the enactment of the Fugitive Offenders
and Mutual Legal Assistant in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill
2019 (“the Bill”) proposed by the Hong Kong government.4 The Bill allows
fugitives to be transferred to the jurisdiction of Mainland China for trial.
Initially, the Bill was proposed in response to a case in which a felon had flown
to Hong Kong from Taiwan and could not subsequently be extradited due to the
lack of relevant agreement between the two jurisdictions.5 Although extradition
had been practiced in the past between Hong Kong and other Commonwealth
jurisdictions, there was no extradition agreement between Hong Kong and

1
Herbert J. Storing, The Case Against Civil Disobedience, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS 85 (Hugo
Adam Bedau ed., Routledge 1991).
2
What is Occupy Central? 10 Key Facts About Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, http://www.scmp.com/article/1604649/what-occupy-central-10-things-you-need-know [hereinafter What is Occupy Central?]
3
Michael Forsyth, Chris Buckley & Alan Wong, In Hong Kong, an Unofficial Election Draws Beijing’s
Ire, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/21/world/asia/in-hong-kong-an-unofficialelection-draws-beijings-ire.html.
4
Annette Wong, Desperate for Democracy: A Comparison between Hong Kong’s 2014 Umbrella Movement and 2019 AntiELAB Protests (2020) (Senior Thesis, Claremont College) (on file with Claremont College).
5
Hong Kong China Plans Explained, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-china-47810723.
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Mainland China.6 However, the protesters feared that if the Bill passed, residents
of Hong Kong and other foreign individuals could be sent to Mainland China
and subjected to politically motivated persecution and subsequent unfair trial.7
It cannot be denied that the Anti-ELAB movement has been involved with
acts of civil disobedience, sometimes even including violence in addition to
these lawful protests.8 For example, in the three-day, citywide strike at the
beginning of August 2019, protesters stormed highways, blocked the CrossHarbour Tunnel, and occupied the airport; among other actions, marches have
frequently escalated into violent clashes with police.9
Needless to say, civil disobedience is an issue that has been frequently
discussed in literature.10 According to John Rawls’ seminal definition, it is “a
public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done
with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the
government.”11 Moreover, in justifying civil disobedience, “one invokes the
commonly shared conception of justice that underlies the political order. It is
assumed that in a reasonably just democratic regime there is a public conception
of justice by reference to which citizens regulate their political affairs and
interpret the constitution.”12 Of course, this definition has been hotly debated
and even challenged by subsequent scholarship. For example, it has been argued
that some limited forms of violence, if used strategically to achieve a specific
objective and to enhance the quality of communication by providing “an
eloquent statement of both the dissenter’s frustration and the importance of the
issues he addresses,” can be justified in the civil disobedience context.13 Indeed,
6

Id.
Hong Kong Protestors Demonstrate Against Extradition Bill, BBC NEWS (June 9, 2019) https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48572130.
8
Mike Ives & Ezra Cheung, Protesters Start Three Days of Civil Disobedience in Hong Kong, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/world/asia/hong-kong-protest.html.
9
Id.
10
See also Nathan J. Miller, International Civil Disobedience: Unauthorized Intervention and the Consequence of the International Community, 74 MD. L. REV. 315, 315 (2015); WILLIAM
SMITH, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 1 (2013); KIMBERLEY BROWNLEE, CONSCIENCE
AND CONVICTION: THE CASE FOR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 5–6 (2012); George Forji Amin, Just Laws versus Unjust
Laws: Asserting the Morality of Civil Disobedience, 3 J.L. & POL. 156, 156 (2010); David Lefkowitz, On a
Moral Right to Civil Disobedience, 117 ETHICS 202, 202 (2007); Martin D. Carcieri, Grutter v. Bollinger and
Civil Disobedience, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 345, 346–47 (2006); Frances Olsen, Civil Disobedience for Social
Change: Constitutional Law as Facilitative or Distracting, 14 GRIFFITH L. REV. 213, 213 (2005).
11
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 320 (revised ed., 1999).
12
Id. at 321.
13
Candice Delmas, Civil Disobedience, 11 PHIL. COMPASS 681, 684 (2016) (quoting Kimberley Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience 349–50 (2004)) (internal citations omitted);
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 267 (1979).
7
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some limited forms of violence have also been witnessed in the specific acts of
civil disobedience involved in the Anti-ELAB movement, as noted above.
Furthermore, it is generally argued that citizens of a nearly just liberal‐
democratic state have a morally justified claim to political authority and that
they enjoy a moral right to engage in acts of suitably constrained civil
disobedience or a moral right to public disobedience.14 It would be erroneous to
conflate the general situation of liberal democracies with the situation in Hong
Kong; this is because the latter, despite enjoying a number of democratic
characteristics, is not a genuine democracy. For example, only half of the
legislators of the Legislative Council are elected by their geographic
constituencies, in which the vote is allocated on a one person, one vote basis.15
Of course, Hong Kong has a robust rule of law, judicial independence, and a
mini constitution, i.e., the Hong Kong Basic Law, the highest law within the
region.16 Moreover, China’s national laws, at least in principle, do not apply
within Hong Kong unless they are listed in the Annex of the Hong Kong Basic
Law.17 Notwithstanding this, the Hong Kong Basic Law ultimately gives the
National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) in Beijing the
authority to determine the pace of democratic reform in Hong Kong.18
To be sure, there has been an ongoing political debate over the shape of Hong
Kong’s future constitutional order, particularly during these demonstrations.19
However, very little attention has been paid to the civil disobedience itself, under
the banner of which a large number of protesters carry out “unlawful” acts,
particularly in the liberal context of Hong Kong under China’s authoritarian
governance. Therefore, this Article addresses the inescapable and challenging
issue of civil disobedience in post-handover Hong Kong, aiming to enrich the
existing scholarship regarding civil disobedience from Hong Kong’s
perspective. It does so by examining the following: (1) the nature of civil
disobedience, using the OCM and the anti-extradition bill protests as examples;
(2) the extent to which civil disobedience can be justified, particularly with
regard to the “One Country, Two Systems” rubric; and (3) the extent to which

14

Lefkowitz, supra note 10, at 233.
See also Owen M. Fiss, Hong Kong Democracy, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 493, 494 (1998).
16
Hong Kong: What Is the Basic Law and How Does It Work?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49633862.
17
Hong Kong Security Law: What is it and is it Worrying, BBC NEWS (June 30, 2020), https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-asia-china-52765838.
18
Hong Kong: What Is Hong Kong’s Basic Law and How Does It Work?, supra note 16.
19
Hong Kong’s Democracy Debate, BBC NEWS (June 18, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiachina-27921954.
15
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civil disobedience can be reconciled with the rule of law and democratic
processes in Hong Kong.
More specifically, the present Article points out that, on its face, the OCM
was a form of civil disobedience that was not only “unlawful” from a purely
legal perspective, but was also questionable in terms of its utility, given the fact
that the region is ultimately subject to the sovereign power of China’s
authoritarian regime. Thus, Beijing possesses the final authority regarding Hong
Kong’s political development to a large extent.20 Moreover, the OCM did not
achieve its original political goal, as the government made no concession to the
demands of the large number of protesters.21 This is not to say, of course, that
peaceful civil disobedience is of no value in retaining Hong Kong’s liberal order;
in fact, retaining its liberal tradition of civic education and public participation
in the face of China’s authoritarian influence is of extreme importance.
Considering this importance, the present Article goes on to examine the
utilitarian value of civil disobedience as a modern form of civic education in
Hong Kong. In turn, it seeks to reconcile the utilitarian justifications for civil
disobedience with the rule of law by identifying clear limitations on permissible
disobedient acts, including the absence of violence as an essential precondition
for justifying civil disobedience. In doing so, this paper further contends that,
civil disobedience of a kind plays a vital role in civic education which may go
some way towards justifying its means. This, in turn, lends support to judicial
approaches that place greater emphasis on the fundamental rights of those who
exercise civil disobedience when determining whether certain acts of civil
disobedience contravene the law. Finally, this Article argues that violent acts in
principle cannot and do not constitute justifiable acts of civil disobedience and
are also unrealistic in the context of Hong Kong under China’s authoritarian rule,
particularly given the importance of retaining a strong rule-of-law tradition in
the region. However, this does not exclude the possibility that some limited
forms of violence may be used as an appropriate strategy in certain exceptional
circumstances, e.g., for enhancing communication, invigorating the public
sphere, etc.
I.

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN HONG KONG: OCM AND ANTI-ELAB

An act of civil disobedience is a deliberate and open violation of the law with
the intent, within the framework of the prevailing form of government, to protest

20
21

Hong Kong Security Law: What Is It and Is It Worrying?, supra note 17.
Id.
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a wrong or to advocate for the betterment of society in some way.22 Put simply,
it is an illegal public protest that is non-violent in character.23 While definitions
and descriptions of civil disobedience are numerous, its essential features can be
generally summarized as follows: (1) it is conscientious; (2) it breaks the law;
(3) it is public; (4) it is an act of protest; and (5) it is non-violent.24 One famous
example recounted by Sophocles is that of Antigone, who chose to obey her
conscience and violate the state edict issued against providing her brother with
a burial after he was decreed a traitor.25 When the dictator Creon reminded her
that such deliberate disobedience of the state law would attract a mandatory
death sentence, “Antigone nobly replied, ‘[n]or did I think your orders were so
strong that you, a mortal man, could overrun the gods’ unwritten and unfailing
laws.’”26 As Lewis H. Van Dusen commented:
Conscience motivated Antigone. She was not testing the validity of the
law in the hope that eventually she would be sustained. Appealing to
the judgment of the community, she explained her action to the chorus.
She was not secret and surreptitious—the interment of her brother was
open and public. She was not violent; she did not trespass on another
citizen’s rights. And finally, she accepted without resistance the death
sentence—the penalty for violation. By voluntarily accepting the law’s
sanctions, she was not a revolutionary denying the authority of the
state.27

Regarding the OCM, the organizers of the movement officially announced
in 2013 that they would begin to promote protests if the government’s proposal
for universal suffrage failed to meet international standards.28 At the time,
organizers hoped to persuade at least 10,000 people to join their planned act of
civil disobedience.29 On August 31, 2014, the NPCSC in Beijing announced that
its decision regarding Hong Kong’s electoral system would be implemented in
2017.30 The electoral framework granted a nominating committee, comprising
22

Morris Keeton, The Morality of Civil Disobedience, 43 TEX. L. REV. 507, 508 (1965).
Carl Cohen, Civil Disobedience and the Law, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 3 (1966).
24
RAWLS, supra note 11, at 320.
25
Lewis H. Van Dusen, Civil Disobedience: Destroyer of Democracy, 55 A.B.A. J. 123, 123 (1969).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Ho Man Leung, Repertoire, Framing and Visions: The Occupy Movement in Hong Kong 78 (July 9,
2016) (unpublished Master thesis, Lingnan University) (on file at the Digital Commons at Lingnan University).
29
Id.
30
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu
Xingzheng Zhangguan Puxuan Wenti He 2016 Nian Lifahui Chansheng Banfa De Jueding (全国人民代表大会
常务委员会关于香港特别行政区行政长官普选问题和2016年立法会产生办法的决定) [The Decision of
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief
Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for
23
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1,200 members from twenty-eight functional constituencies, the power to
nominate two to three candidates for the office of Chief Executive in accordance
with democratic procedures.31 In turn, the Chief Executive-elect, after being
selected through universal suffrage, would have to be appointed by the Central
Government.32 Immediately after this reform package was officially adopted by
the NPCSC, protests broke out.33 The reforms were deemed by the prodemocracy camp to restrict political views, as the procedure they laid out
effectively enabled only Beijing-approved candidates to advance through the
nomination process.34
On September 27, 2014, organizers announced the official commencement
of the civil disobedience movement, which had begun as a student protest
movement.35 Surprisingly, at its peak, the pro-democracy movement saw tens of
thousands of Hong Kong residents from all walks of life take to the streets.36
Interestingly, it was not strong warnings or even threats on the part of the
government, but rather an injunction granted by a court that played a primary
role in clearing the protest sites and bringing an end to the movement.37 To some
extent, the restoration of peace in this instance can be ascribed to Hong Kong’s
rule of law and judicial independence.
Having said this, it can be seen that the OCM in Hong Kong was not a
general public demonstration, but rather an act of civil disobedience involving
public violation of the law. The OCM had itself stated that participants in the
movement could have been guilty of “obstruct[ing], inconvenien[cing] or
endanger[ing], any person or vehicle in a public place,” under the Summary
Offenses Ordinance.38 Moreover, according to the Public Order Ordinance,
OCM could also have constituted an unlawful assembly: “when 3 or more

Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016] (adopted
at the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People’s Congress, Aug. 31, 2014).
31
Full Text of NPC Decision on Universal Suffrage for HK Chief Executive Selection, CHINA.ORG.CN
(Aug. 31, 2014), http://www.china.org.cn/china/2014-08/31/content_33390388.htm.
32
Id.
33
Chris Buckley & Michael Forsythe, China Restricts Voting Reforms for Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
31, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/world/asia/hong-kong-elections.html.
34
Johannes Chan, Human Rights, the Rule of Law and Democracy: Recent Experience of Hong Kong and
China, U. H.K.FAC. L. RES. PAPER No. 2015/039 (Aug. 4, 2015).
35
Thousands at Hong Kong Protest as Occupy Central is Launched, BBC NEWS (Sept. 27, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29397738.
36
Hong Kong Protests: What Changed at Mong Kok?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-china-29054196.
37
HK Protesters Brace for Clearance after Injunction Published, BBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2014),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-30390595.
38
Summary Offenses Ordinance, (2017) Cap. 228, § 4A.
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persons assemble[] . . . to cause any person reasonably to fear that the persons
so assembled will commit a breach of the peace, or will by such conduct provoke
other persons to commit a breach of the peace[.]”39
Ultimately, a minibus management company, together with Lai Hoi-ping
and Tam Chun-hung on behalf of the Taxi Drivers and Operators Association,
brought private lawsuits against those members of the movement who
unlawfully occupied or remained on the public highway and were granted an
injunction order by the court.40 In Chiu Luen Public Light Bus Co. Ltd. v.
Persons Unlawfully Occupying or Remaining on the Public Highway (the
“Public Light Bus Case”), the Court of First Instance, referring to Leung Tsang
Hung & Another v. The Incorporated Owners of Kwok Wing House,41 stated
that:
His Lordship identified three elements which constituted the tort of
public nuisance: (1) A state of affairs which endangers the lives,
safety, health, property, or comfort of the public, or obstructs the public in the exercise or enjoyment of any right that is common to members of the public. (2) An act or omission committed by the defendants
that is causative of particular injury to a member of the public. The
injury caused to the plaintiffs must be of a foreseeable type. (3) The
defendants knew or ought to reasonably to have known that his act or
omission would result in the likely consequence of a nuisance hazard
presenting a real risk of harm to the public.
On the evidence before me, [Ribeiro PJ] agree[s] with Mr. Mok’s submissions that a state of affairs has arisen which endangers the comfort
and convenience of the property as well as obstructs the public in the
exercise of enjoyment of their right to use the areas in question as a
two-way carriageway for normal vehicular traffic.42

On this basis, the act of civil disobedience in question engaged in by the OCM
was held to constitute tortious conduct under Hong Kong common law and was
thus determined to be unlawful.43 The court further ruled that:

39

Public Order Ordinance, (2019) Cap. 245, § 18(1).
Chiu Luen Public Light Bus Co. Ltd. v. Persons Unlawfully Occupying or Remaining on the Public
Highway, Namely, the Westbound Carriageway of Argyle Street Between the Junction of Tung Choi Street and
Portland Street and/or Other Persons Hindering or Preventing the Passing or Repassing of Argyle Street, (2014)
2086 H.K.L.R.D. ¶¶ 4, 5 (C.F.I.) (H.K.).
41
See generally Leung Tsang Hung v. Incorporated Owners of Kwok Wing House, (2007) 4 H.K.L.R.D.
654, (C.F.A.) (H.K.).
42
Public Light Bus Co Ltd., (2014) 2086 H.K.L.R.D. ¶¶ 17–18 (H.K).
43
Id. ¶¶ 11–13.
40
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[W]hen the demonstration in question based on civil disobedience has
taken place for so long, in such a scale which has affected so many
people and which has the real risk of turning into civil disorder, . . . the
fact that the demonstration is civil disobedience, no matter how noble
the underlying cause the participants may consider it to be, can constitute a factor which militates against the granting of an injunction.44

In terms of a possible ground for a defense based on the participant’s
fundamental rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and demonstration, as
guaranteed under Article 27 of the Basic Law, the court held that the defendant’s
conduct in the purported exercise caused an obstruction that far exceeded the
bounds of what was reasonable in light of the length of the demonstration, the
extent of the demonstration, and the increasingly violent nature of the
confrontation between the protesters and the police.45 In this way, the court
determined that the protesters’ conduct was disproportionate and that any
defense relying on fundamental rights was unlikely to succeed.46
Although OCM has sometimes been referred to as the “[U]mbrella
[R]evolution,”47 it was not a genuine revolution—i.e., a forcible overthrow of a
government or social order—insofar as it was not characterized by the
destruction of property, personal injury, and death for many, or the complete
disruption of community life.48 Of course, civil disobedience might not prohibit
minor property damage, which may be inevitable in certain circumstances.
Furthermore, it is obvious that the movement was not seeking to overthrow the
constituted authority or to repudiate that authority. The organizers of the OCM
accepted the established authority and the general legitimacy of the system of
laws.49 Their overall fidelity to the law can to a certain extent be demonstrated
by the effectiveness of the court’s ruling ordering the occupied areas to be
cleared following the failure of police officers to disperse the protesters.50 In
fact, the leaders of the movement eventually handed themselves in to police for
“taking part in an unauthorised assembly.”51 Moreover, the actions of the
movement differed from direct civil disobedience, which involves disobeying
44

Id. ¶ 31.
Id. ¶¶ 32, 33.
46
Id.
47
Jonathan Kaiman, Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution, GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/30/-sp-hong-kong-umbrella-revolution-pro-democracy-protests.
48
Cohen, supra note 23, at 4.
49
For more details about the difference between the revolution and civil disobedience, see Cohen, supra
note 23, at 3–4.
50
HK Protesters Brace for Clearance after Injunction Published, supra note 37.
51
Jonathan Kaiman, Occupy Central Leaders Surrender to Hong Kong Police, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/03/occupy-central-surrender-hong-kong-police-protests.
45

WANG_2.9.21

30

2/10/2021 1:03 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

the law against which the protest is being made.52 Thus, OCM was an exercise
in indirect civil disobedience, as the disobedience in question was not targeted
against laws such as the Summary Offenses Ordinance and the Public Order
Ordinance, but instead against the electoral framework proposed by the
NPCSC.53
As far as the Anti-ELAB protests are concerned, the protesters have
expressed concerns that the Chinese authorities would use the ELAB as a
political tool to target persons who have offended Beijing, although the proposed
legislation excludes political crimes, and the government of Hong Kong has tried
to relieve the public’s concerns regarding human rights.54 In terms of strategy,
the protesters, who are described as being leaderless, have employed a variety
of tactics, including lawful protests and acts of civil disobedience, as well as
radical methods that were adopted largely due to the ineffectiveness of peaceful
ones.55 The radical methods used included: storming the Legislative Council,
blocking major roads to disrupt transportation, calling for city-wide strikes,
blocking the toll plaza in Hung Hom, vandalizing shops perceived to be proBeijing, paralyzing the train system, etc.56 The movement also tried to employ
some potentially provocative branding or language tactics, such as the phrase
“[U]mbrella [R]evolution”57 or the declaration of a “Provisional Government of
Hong Kong.”58 In so doing, the protesters put “themselves outside [the
traditionally] accepted channels of public dissent[.]”59
It should be noted that, at the beginning of the protests in March 2019, the
demonstrations were lawful and peaceful.60 Subsequently, due to the lack of
52

Cohen, supra note 23, at 23.
All acts of civil disobedience can fall into one of two categories: direct disobedience and indirect disobedience. For more details, see Cohen, supra note 23, at 4.
54
Austin Ramzy, Hong Kong March: Vast Protest of Extradition Bill Shows Fear of Eroding Freedoms,
N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/09/world/asia/hong-kong-extradition-protest.
html.
55
Yan Sham-Shackleton, Hong Kong’s Third Generation of Democracy Fighters Are Not Just Rioters,
They Are Last Line of Resistance, H.K. FREE PRESS (July 28, 2019), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/07/28/
hong-kongs-third-generation-democracy-fighters-not-just-rioters-last-line-resistance/.
56
Id.; Julia Hollingsworth & James Griffiths, Hong Kong Government Building a ‘Big Crime Scene’
After Night of Violent Protests, CNN (July 2, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/02/asia/hong-kong-protests-legco-intl-hnk/index.html.
57
Kaiman, supra note 47.
58
Protesters Plan to Topple HK Government, New Manifesto for Provisional Government Recited, Senior Government Officials to be Dismissed, DIMSUM DAILY (Oct. 5, 2019), https://www.dimsumdaily.hk/protesters-plan-to-topple-hk-government-new-manifesto-for-provisional-government-recited-senior-government-officials-to-be-dimissed/.
59
Delmas, supra note 13, at 685.
60
Amy Qin, Hong Kong’s Leader, Faced with More Clashes, Condemns Violence, N.Y. TIMES (July 15,
53
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government response to the public demands, a later protest march at the peak of
the movement on June 16, 2019, was attended by around two million people, as
estimated by the organizers.61
Admittedly, unlike the large-scale OCM demonstrations, during which the
government made no concessions whatsoever,62 the Anti-ELAB protests
resulted in at least some government response to the demands of the public: the
bill in question, although rhetorically supported by the Central Government of
China, was formally withdrawn by the Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam
on July 9, 2019.63 It should be noted that after a series of mostly peaceful
demonstrations, some violent clashes or incidents between the protesters and the
police did occur during demonstrations.64 Clashes between pro-Beijing
demonstrators and pro-democracy protesters also took place.65 One such clash
occurred in the Yuen Long train station, where an unknown group of masked
people dressed in white attacked protesters in black and some civilians as they
were marching.66 While the protests have gained tremendous support from the
international community,67 the protesters have not yet received any positive
response on the part of the government to their other demands, which include
the withdrawal of the characterization of the June 12 protests as a “riot,” the
unconditional release of all arrested protesters, and universal suffrage for the
government of Hong Kong.68
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/15/world/asia/hong-kong-carrie-lam-sha-tin-protest.html.
61
‘Nearly 2 Million’ People Take to Streets, Forcing Public Apology from Hong Kong Leader Carrie
Lam as Suspension of Controversial Extradition Bill Fails to Appease Protesters, S. CHINA MORNING POST (June
17, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/print/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3014737/nearly-2-million-people-takestreets-forcing-public-apology.
62
Jeffie Lam, Four Years on from Failed Occupy Protests, What Next for Hong Kong’s Deflated Democracy Movement?, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/print/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2166075/four-years-failed-occupy-protests-what-next-hong-kongs.
63
Hong Kong Extradition Bill “is Dead” Says Carrie Lam, BBC NEWS (July 9, 2019), https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-asia-china-48917796; Hong Kong Leader Carrie Lam Announces Formal Withdrawal of the
Extradition Bill and Sets up a Platform to Look into Key Causes of Protest Crisis, S. CHINA MORNING POST
(Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/print/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3025641/hong-kong-leader-carrie-lam-announce-formal-withdrawal.
64
Qin, supra note 60.
65
Hong Kong Protesters Clash with Pro-Beijing Counterparts, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 15, 2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/hong-kong-protesters-clash-pro-beijing-counterparts-190914140138
713.html.
66
Mike Ives, Mob Beats Antigovernment Protesters in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/21/world/asia/hong-kong-protest-police.html.
67
Victor Ting, Phila Siu & Cherie Chan, From Vancouver to New York to Brisbane, Rallies Around
World Express Solidarity with Hong Kong’s Mass Protest Against Extradition Agreement, S. CHINA MORNING
POST (June 9, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/print/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3013748/berlin-brisbane-rallies-12-countries-express-solidarity.
68
Kris Cheng, Hong Kong Anti-extradition Law Demonstration Set for Sunday, H. K. FREE PRESS
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Meanwhile, it is also interesting to note that during the ongoing Anti-ELAB
protests, the voter turnout in the local District Council elections on November
24, 2019, was the highest since elections began in Hong Kong in 1999.69 Due to
the fact that elections were conducted during the ongoing Anti-ELAB protests,
they have been widely considered a de facto referendum on the ongoing prodemocracy movement.70 Although Beijing and its allies considered the elections
to be a way to hear the voice of a silent majority after the months of increasingly
violent protests, the democrats’ triumph in the elections—seizing control of
seventeen of Hong Kong’s eighteen district councils by taking more than 340 of
the 452 seats—has clearly shown the overwhelming popular support for the
movement in Hong Kong.71 The outcome, which largely stood in opposition to
Beijing’s rhetoric of labelling the protesters as “rioters,” even caused China’s
state-controlled media to lapse into silence; it described the detailed results as
neither a win nor a loss.72
To contrast OCM with the anti-extradition bill protests, the former was less
likely to impose substantial pressure on the Hong Kong government to respond
to the demands of large-scale protests effectively under the “One Country, Two
Systems” principle. This decision was to be made by the NPCSC, although the
government of Hong Kong did have some initiative.73 Under China’s
authoritarian system, it is a basic principle that an inferior authority, i.e., the
government of Hong Kong, should be submissive to the formal decisions made
by the NPCSC.74 To a certain extent, the withdrawal of the NPCSC decision

(July 18, 2019), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/07/18/hong-kong-anti-extradition-law-demo-set-sundaypro-beijing-lawmakers-urge-govt-ban-protests-till-sept/.
69
K.K. Rebecca Lai & Jin Wu, Hong Kong Election Results Mapped, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/24/world/asia/hong-kong-election-results.html.
70
Shibani Mahtani, Simon Denyer, Tiffany Liang & Anna Kam, Hong Kong’s Pro-democracy Parties
Sweeping Aside Pro-Beijing Establishment in Local Elections, Early Results Show, WASH. POST (Nov. 24,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/record-turnout-in-hong-kong-election-seen-as-a-referendumon-the-pro-democracy-protest-movement/2019/11/24/31804b00-0df5-11ea-8054-289aef6e38a3_story.html.
71
Tony Cheung, Hong Kong Elections: Pro-Beijing Collapse Shows Identity Politics More Important
than Community Issues for District Council Success, Analysts Say, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3039201/hong-kong-elections-pro-beijing-collapseshows-identity.
72
Keith Bradsher, Hong Kong Election Landslide Signals More Frictions with Beijing, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/world/asia/hong-kong-election-protests.html; Jillian Kay Melchior, After Hong Kong’s Democratic Landslide, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-hong-kongs-democratic-landslide-11575591771.
73
Albert H.Y. Chen, Hong Kong’s Internal Contradiction of “One Country, Two Systems”, ECONOMIST
(Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.economist.com/open-future/2019/10/11/hong-kongs-internal-contradiction-ofone-country-two-systems.
74
Mike Ives, What is Hong Kong’s Extradition Bill, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/10/world/asia/hong-kong-extradition-bill.html.
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would somehow imply that the decision was wrong, or at least inappropriate.75
A concession of this kind, which is extraordinarily rare in an authoritarian
regime, would be a danger for the higher authority as it is likely to encourage
additional civil rights movements in the future.76 This is a scenario that an
authoritarian regime generally attempts to avoid as much as possible. By
contrast, the anti-extradition bill protests have presented a direct challenge to the
decision of the government of Hong Kong itself; it is responsive to a certain
extent to a domestic public demand in the current semi-democratic system.77
This situation can be distinguished from the OCM protests in that there is no
effective constitutional channel by which the Hong Kong people can challenge
any decision of the NPCSC.78 In this regard, civil disobedience against the
actions or inactions of the Hong Kong government within its domain of
autonomy, rather than similar measures taken against the external NPCSC, is
more likely to be workable in the context of Hong Kong’s semi-democratic
system. In Hong Kong, civil liberties (in particular the freedoms of speech, press,
association, and assembly) and civil society can largely flourish, although the
government is only elected by a select Election Committee with 1,200 members
at present.79
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN HONG KONG?
Admittedly, justifying the need for civil disobedience in society tends to be
complicated as it involves a range of interacting factors.80 Keeton outlined these
factors as follows:

75
Ryan Hass, Why Now? Understanding Beijing’s New Assertiveness in Hong Kong, BROOKINGS
(July 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/07/17/why-now-understanding-beijings-new-assertiveness-in-hong-kong/.
76
Id.
77
See generally Hong Kong Leader Carrie Lam Announces Formal Withdrawal of the Extradition Bill
and Sets up a Platform to Look into Key Causes of Protest Crisis, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 4, 2019),
https://www.scmp.com/print/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3025641/hong-kong-leader-carrie-lam-announceformal-withdrawal.
78
See Kimmy Chung, Hong Kong Courts Have No Power to Challenge Decisions of China’s Top Legislative Body, Says Beijing Loyalist Maria Tam, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.scmp.
com/news/hong-kong/article/2126239/little-chance-china-forcing-through-decision-national-security-law; see
also Song Sio-Chong, NPCSC’s Decision Cannot be Challenged, CHINA DAILY, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
hkedition/2014-09/22/content_18636420.htm (Sept. 22, 2014).
79
Michael Delaney, What Just Happened in Hong Kong’s Elections?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 28, 2019),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/25/what-happened-hong-kong-elections/#.
80
Keeton, supra note 22, at 508.

WANG_2.9.21

34

2/10/2021 1:03 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

Among the important ones are:
(1)

serious injustice or major opportunity for betterment, as perceived by the victim or others, in the laws or in their application;

(2)

lack of a reasonable prospect for the aggrieved to obtain remedy
through recourse to due process of law;

(3)

unavailability of effective non-legal recourses that are less hazardous or costly to the protesters than civil disobedience;

(4)

availability of tactics and strategy of civil disobedience that create a minimum of costs to other rights and to social order;

(5)

incompatibility of the offending law or its implementation with
a more fundamental law of the land;

(6)

strength of the injured parties’ conviction, or conviction that they
are under religious or moral compulsion to act, and ability on
their part to muster the courage and other means to persist in their
protest;

(7)

availability of a moral or legal basis in the thinking of non-committed bystanders to which the injured can appeal to gain support, or at least neutralize opposition; and

(8)

compatibility of the use of civil disobedience with the legal system and culture of the society.81

Again, it can be seen that these conditions are very complex. However, generally
speaking, two approaches to justifying civil disobedience may be employed:
higher law justification and utilitarian justification.82
A. Higher Law Justification
Under the rule of law, everyone is equal before and has a duty to obey the
law.83 Given that civil disobedience involves illegality, it is impossible to justify
such conduct merely by appealing to positive laws. Any such justification must
therefore be made by appealing to a “law” higher than positive laws, such as
“divine law,” “natural law,” “justice,” or “conscience.”84 It could be argued that
such laws or principles “impose duties so compelling that they override and
cancel out any conflicting obligations”—in short, that “no statute devised by
81

Id. at 513.
Cohen, supra note 23, at 12–13.
83
What is the Rule of Law, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/ (last
visited Oct. 2, 2020).
84
See generally Kent Greenawalt, The Natural Duty to Obey the Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1, 38–48 (1985).
82
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humans can outweigh them.”85 By this reasoning, civil disobedience can be
justified in situations where positive laws have been exhausted but justice has
yet to be achieved.86 Such a defense of civil disobedience is compatible with the
natural law theory, namely, that:
A just law is a man made code that squares with the moral law or the
law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the
moral law. To put it in the terms of Saint Thomas Aquinas: An unjust
law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal and natural law.87

However, when appealing to a “higher law” or “natural law” that is not
subject to public verification, each person may well make their own reasonable
but different moral judgements on the subject; this leads to a clear impasse.88 Of
course, in a modern society, “[i]n justifying civil disobedience one does not
appeal to principles of personal morality or to religious doctrines, though these
may coincide with and support one’s claims. . . . Instead one invokes the
commonly shared conception of justice that underlies the political order.”89 This
is because “[i]t is assumed that in a reasonably just democratic regime there is a
public conception of justice by reference to which citizens regulate their political
affairs and interpret the constitution.”90
The higher law justification is generally applicable to direct civil
disobedience where the positive law has been considered insufficient for
upholding justice.91 Under modern constitutionalism, the justification for the
illegality involved in civil disobedience is plausible only if the constitutional law
or some of its provisions are considered unjust.92 If the highest positive law, i.e.
constitutional law, is able to uphold justice, then there will be no need to resort
to civil disobedience that involves illegality.93 For example, citizens can simply
bring a lawsuit before a court to review the constitutionality of a specific statute
by claiming that such an unjust law violates some civil and political rights
entrenched in the Hong Kong Basic Law.94

85

Cohen, supra note 23, at 10.
Id.
87
Letter from a Birmingham Jail [King, Jr.], to Fellow Clergymen (Apr. 16, 1963) (on file with American
Studies Center-University of Pennsylvania).
88
Cohen, supra note 23, at 12.
89
RAWLS, supra note 11, at 321.
90
Id.
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See Cohen, supra note 23, at 12.
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See generally id.
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Id.
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See J.F. Mathews, The Legal System of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 18 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 3, 5 (1997).
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It can be clearly seen from the above that the OCM did not resort to a “higher
law,” “natural law,” or the like to justify its actions. Instead, on the surface, the
movement attempted to use the notion of democracy with “international
standards” as justification.95 Of course, to a certain extent, democracy with
“international standards” itself is not a universally accepted “higher law”; the
idea of universal democracy is relatively new and is a product of the twentieth
century.96 As an example, consider the United Nations (U.N.): while, as human
rights principles have evolved to become one of the central arms in the U.N.’s
machinery, the organization holds a very powerful institutional position in the
international arena,97 it must be admitted that democracy has no such equivalent
ideological standing at the UN.98 As Sen stated, “democracy is not yet
universally practiced, nor indeed universally accepted, in the general climate of
world opinion[.]”99 Thus, it would be difficult to conclude that “democracy in
accordance with international standards” should be taken as a “law” occupying
a higher position than constitutional law or other positive laws.100 In fact, it is
democratic governance that has now achieved primacy, and the civil and
political rights listed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) are viewed as essential for modern democracy.101
Moreover, democracy is very valuable for underpinning human rights.102
Sen summarizes the way this has been achieved.103 “First, political freedom is a
part of human freedom in general, and exercising civil and political rights is a
crucial part of good lives of individuals as social beings.”104 Secondly,
“democracy has an important instrumental value in enhancing” people’s ability
to be heard when expressing and supporting their claims to political attention
(including claims of economic needs).105 Thirdly, “the practice of democracy

95
See Leung, supra note 28, at 78; see also Amartya Sen, Democracy as a Universal Value, 10 J.
DEMOCRACY 3, 4 (1999).
96
Sen, supra note 95, at 4.
97
See Gudmundur Alfredsson, The United Nations and Human Rights, 25 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 17, 17
(1997).
98
Christof Heyns & Frans Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 483, 535 (2001); see ANNE GALLAGHER, MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS
MONITORING: AN INTRODUCTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OFFICERS 1–2 (2008).
99
Sen, supra note 95, at 5.
100
Prospects for Democracy and Press Freedom in Hong Kong: Roundtable Before the CongressionalExecutive Comm. on China, 113th Cong. 7 (2014) (statement of Martin Lee, Founding Chairman, Democratic
Party of Hong Kong).
101
Discussion Paper, Democracy and Human Rights: The Role of the UN 12 (Sept. 2013).
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See id. at 7.
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See id.
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Sen, supra note 95 at 10.
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gives citizens an opportunity to learn from one another, and helps society to form
its values and priorities.”106 These aforementioned values are strengthened by
democracy. In the liberal context of Hong Kong, the values enshrined in
democracy have been widely shared and accepted during the OCM and AntiELAB movement, and consequently may be treated as a kind of “higher law.”
Despite this, however, it is worth noting that there are usually two forms of
civil disobedience: direct and indirect.107 The former refers to instances in which
an unjust law that is opposed by the disobedient actors is broken, while the latter
refers to breaking a just law in order to protest against another law or policy.108
For example, as Cohen wrote, “if the object of protest is the conduct of a war or
other foreign policy it may be impossible for the protester to violate that policy
directly.”109 Furthermore, “if the object of a protest is not a law but the absence
of a law, or other administrative nonfeasance, direct civil disobedience would
be impossible.”110
When compared with direct civil disobedience, the justification for civil
disobedience may necessarily differ in the context of indirect civil
disobedience.111 As Cohen has pointed out:
[I]ndirect civil disobedience may involve the violation of statutes
themselves entirely wholesome, in the effort to remedy serious injustice in another but related sphere. And the law thus broken will be admittedly a matter of careful human selection, not divine command.
Such indirect protest could not be defended as the consequence of a
conflict between divine and positive laws. 112

Even in cases where the law being broken (for example, the Public Order
Ordinance in the OCM) is not the object of the protest, it cannot be concluded
that indirect civil disobedience cannot be justified. Given that civil disobedience
is a political act, it certainly can be justified so long as the action addresses the
majority that holds political power by appealing to the commonly shared
conception of justice that underlies the political order, as “[i]t is assumed that in
a reasonably just democratic regime there is a public conception of justice by

106
107
108
109
110
111
112
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Cohen, supra note 23, at 4.
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Id. at 5.
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Id. at 12
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reference to which citizens regulate their political affairs and interpret the
constitution.”113
With that said, it can be seen that the OCM can be categorized as an act of
indirect civil disobedience, as Hong Kong people were unable to directly act in
violation of the NPCSC decision; instead, they chose indirect civil disobedience
as a means of protest. However, given that Hong Kong is a special autonomous
regime under China’s authoritarian system,114 the theories of either direct or
indirect civil disobedience, as applicable in a “reasonably just democratic
regime,” cannot be simply applied to Hong Kong under the circumstances.115
Given the high degree of Hong Kong’s autonomy, there are actually two types
of objects of the protest in civil disobedience: one is within the autonomy of
Hong Kong’s common law system, while the other is outside.
More specifically, the OCM broke the common laws of Hong Kong in order
to protest against a decision, claimed to be unjustified by protesters according to
the values of democracy, that was not drawn from Hong Kong but rather from
outside Hong Kong.116 It is thus even more complicated to justify civil
disobedience from a “higher law” perspective under these circumstances, as the
protesters used the common values of democracy to override the NPCSC
decision in Beijing. This represented a direct challenge to the authority of
China’s Central Government, along with its sovereign power and lack of
democratic accountability to Hong Kong under the framework of “One Country,
Two Systems.”117 In other words, if Beijing was to make an arbitrary decision
regarding a jurisdiction, but had no democratic accountability to the people in
this jurisdiction, it would be impractical for people living there to protest against
Beijing’s decision through civil disobedience, precisely due to the absence of
democratic accountability on the part of Beijing.
Although Hong Kong has been a part of China since its handover in 1997,118
along with decisive authority over Hong Kong’s democratic development
according to the Hong Kong Basic Law, China has no democratic accountability

113

RAWLS, supra note 11, at 320–21.
See Hong Kong’s National Security Law: The Nail in the Coffin for One Country, Two Systems, HUM.
RTS. FOUND. (July 1, 2020).
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to the people of Hong Kong under the “One Country, Two Systems” principle;119
it is thus also impractical for the people of Hong Kong to protest against a
decision made by Beijing specifically by breaking Hong Kong’s common law.
In this regard, pragmatically speaking, civil disobedience may make sense when
undertaken against the action or inaction of the Hong Kong government within
the domain of Hong Kong’s autonomy, through resorting to some “higher law”
in whatever form this may take, such as the common values of democracy and
the rule of law cited by the Anti-ELAB movement. This is largely because the
government of Hong Kong does have a degree of democratic accountability to
the people of Hong Kong under its current semi-democratic system. It can thus
be seen that the withdrawal of the Hong Kong government-proposed extradition
bill, which occurred largely due to the increasing pressure imposed by the AntiELAB movement, may to a certain extent constitute evidence that civil
disobedience against the government of Hong Kong in its domain of autonomy
(rather than directly against the acts of Central Government outside the domain
of autonomy) may be effective in certain circumstances. Of course, this is by no
means intended to deny that people have a right to civil disobedience in an
illiberal state; as Raz stressed, “members of the illiberal state do have a right to
civil disobedience which is roughly that part of their moral right to political
participation which is not recognized in law.”120 Indeed, the justification
discussed here is not applicable to civil disobedience in general, but rather to the
particular acts of unlawful disobedience that occurred in Hong Kong under the
“One Country, Two Systems” framework.
B. Utilitarian Justification
Applying a utilitarian approach, it is possible to argue that the “deliberate
disobedience of a particular law at a particular time, under particular
circumstances, with the normal punishment for that disobedience ensuing, is
likely to lead in the long run to a better or [more] just[] society than would
compliance (under those circumstances) with the law in question.”121 However,
this is only the beginning, as two kinds of considerations—moral and factual—
need to be employed.122
Factually speaking, those wishing to engage in civil disobedience must first
seek solutions within the legal system.123 If not all channels within the law have
119
120
121
122
123
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See id. at 13.
See id. at 14.

WANG_2.9.21

40

2/10/2021 1:03 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

been explored, or if these channels have not been explored fully enough, it is
unjustifiable to resort to law-breaking.124 No one can deny that civil
disobedience can encourage lawlessness and potentially undermine the most
basic values of a law-abiding society. Even if a participant in civil disobedience
insists upon submitting themselves for public punishment and humiliation for
their disobedience to demonstrate respect for the legal system,125 at the same
time, civil disobedience is more likely to encourage others to impulsively break
the law.126 This is consistent with the fact that a large number of illegal acts and
many complaints followed from the OCM and Anti-ELAB protests.127
In addition, civil disobedience can cause inconvenience and injury to the
community.128 For example, it was reported that chaos continued to reign in
Mong Kok for a sustained period during the OCM, and that many people were
subjected to violence.129 Moreover, the sporadic violence intensified in Yuen
Long in July 2019, when protesters continued their march for a full withdrawal
of a suspended bill following the mostly peaceful protests in the earliest stage.130
As far as economic costs are concerned, it was reported that the OCM movement
cost Hong Kong up to 350 billion Hong Kong Dollars.131 Moreover, the AntiELAB movement has had a tremendous negative impact on Hong Kong’s
economy. For example, statistics show that the number of tourists traveling to
Hong Kong declined by forty percent in August 2019 compared to August of the
last year,132 while retail sales experienced the worst decline on record over the
summer, exceeding even that which occurred in 1998 during the Asian financial
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crisis.133 There is no doubt that a large number of businesses and citizens have
suffered because of the protest movements.
Notwithstanding these limitations, from a moral perspective, Hong Kong’s
community—with its liberal traditions—has shared common values of
democracy and rule of law, albeit democracy according to international
standards is not a “higher law” than positive law.134 In this regard, civil
disobedience in Hong Kong’s liberal context can be justified by the role it plays
in the civic education of the Hong Kong polity.
Hong Kong enjoys autonomy under the “One Country, Two Systems”
rubric, but delivery of traditional forms of civic education in the region has
proven challenging in the shadow of China’s authoritarian influence.135 For
example, while Hong Kong’s 1996 Guidelines on Civic Education in School
emphasized human-rights education, education on democracy, education on the
rule of law, global education, and education on critical thinking, the resumption
of Chinese sovereignty has seen nationalism and patriotism become the central
elements of curriculum development.136 In particular, the new civic-education
guidelines that have replaced the 1996 guidelines emphasize students becoming
“‘good citizens’, shouldering duties and obligations of the individual to society,
having virtues associated with traditional Chinese culture and values, and having
a strong attachment to ethno-cultural nationalism[.]”137
The above has important implications in post-handover Hong Kong, as civic
education is linked to a healthy civic life in modern, democratic societies.
Indeed, one global study has identified civic education as contributing to: (i)
significant increases in rates of political participation, especially at the local
level; (ii) more moderate (but still significant) increases in participants’
knowledge about their political system, as well as democratic structures and

133
Denise Tsang & Danny Lee, Hong Kong Retail Sales Suffer Worst Decline on Record Amid Anti-Government Protests and US-China Trade War, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/
news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3031278/hong-kong-retail-sales-suffer-worst-decline-record.
134
Cohen, supra note 23, at 10–12. In extraordinary cases, the civilly disobedient person may adopt moral
standards in sharp conflict with those professed by his community. For example, a racist may engage in civil
disobedience to defend segregation or members of the Nazi Party may practice civil disobedience to further their
ends. Employing such moral standards, the utilitarian defense of civil disobedience is certain to fail; it can hope
to succeed only when the moral ideals of the disobedient are themselves defensible. See id. at 13.
135
Kerry J. Kennedy, Comparative Insights on Civics and Citizenship Education and the Curriculum: A
View from Hong Kong, in CIVICS AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN AUSTRALIA: CHALLENGES, PRACTICES, AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 245, 245, 247–48 (Andrew Peterson & Libby Tudball eds., 2018).
136
Id. at 249–50.
137
Lau Chui Shan, Challenges to Teaching Citizenship Education in Hong Kong After the Handover, EJOURNAL EDUC. POL’Y (2011) (citation omitted).
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institutions in general; and (iii) an increase in participants’ sense of political
efficacy.138 Civic education has thus been identified as “an antidote for political
apathy.”139
Despite the strong colonial tradition of political protest in Hong Kong, a
survey published in 2000 indicated growing passivity within the Hong Kong
polity. Notably, 90.1% of Hongkongers interviewed stated that they were not
motivated to vote in District Council elections, as they believed that such
participation would have little effect on Hong Kong’s overall political structure
and policy.140 These results are consistent with general trends in other
authoritarian regimes, in which polities gradually lose political consciousness
and descend into apathy over time.141
Against this background—particularly considering the limitations placed on
more ‘traditional’ forms of civic education in Hong Kong—civic disobedience
(such as that undertaken by OCM and those involved in the Anti-ELAB
movement), together with lawful protests, necessarily has an important
educational function. Indeed, civic disobedience is a well-accepted form of
modern civic education142 in which participants experientially learn about civic
matters (such as democratic standards and political and constitutional processes,
as well as non-democratic aspects such as the nature of dictatorship, humanrights abuses in authoritarian states, etc.) through their civic action.143
In fact, empirical evidence suggests that experiential education of this nature
may be the most effective means of fostering civic learning and engagement.144
Up to 100,000 protesters are reported to have participated in the OCM, meaning
that the Movement had significant educative reach in Hong Kong.145 Moreover,
as noted above, there were more than two million protesters involved in the anti-

138
USAID: OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, APPROACHES TO CIVIC EDUCATION: LESSONS LEARNED 1 (2002),
https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACP331.pdf.
139
Margaret Stimmann Branson, Civil Education: An Antidote for Political Apathy?, BPB (Apr. 1, 2003),
http://www.bpb.de/veranstaltungen/dokumentation/130056/civic-education-an-antidote-for-political-apathy.
140
SIU-KAI LIU, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN HONG KONG 302 (2000).
141
See JUAN J. LINZ, TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 167 (2000).
142
See Jack Crittenden & Peter Levine, Civic Education, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civic-education (Aug. 31, 2018).
143
See id.
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Anne Marie Roantree & Lisa Jucca, Thousands Denounce HSBC Board Member’s Likening of Hong
Kong People to Freed Slaves, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-china
-idUSKBN0IK0DV20141031.

WANG_2.9.21

2021]

2/10/2021 1:03 PM

HONG KONG’S CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

43

extradition bill protests (as claimed by the organizers).146 Indeed, the large-scale,
peaceful movement “certainly made some people more aware of the meaning of
universal suffrage[.]”147
Furthermore, movements such as the OCM impact upon political
engagement. Notably, in Hong Kong’s November 2015 District Council
elections, a record forty-seven percent of eligible voters turned out to vote.148
Moreover, three “Umbrella Soldier” candidates (i.e. those who participated in
the pro-democratic Umbrella Movement protests) won electoral seats.149 This
indicates that the OCM, by providing an experiential, civic-learning platform,
has had a lasting impact on Hong Kong’s political landscape, encouraging more
active, political participants.150 In addition, during the Anti-ELAB movement, a
record number of voters registered for the District Council election of 2019,
including about 390,000 new voter registrations.151 In particular, many prodemocracy candidates who had actively participated in the Anti-ELAB
movement eventually won their electoral seats, which clearly indicates the
increasing popular awareness of the importance of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy
movement.152
In this way, civic education through civic disobedience can be understood as
playing a self-perpetuating role in maintaining Hong Kong’s longstanding
tradition of public protest, as well as contributing to a more robust civic life.
This is particularly important given the increasing difficulties faced in Hong
Kong in mobilizing the public and staging open confrontational action in relation
to China.

146
Hong Kong Protest: ‘Nearly Two Million’ Join Demonstration, BBC NEWS (June 17, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48656471.
147
JOSEPH CHENG, NEW TRENDS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN HONG KONG 473 (2014).
148
Gary Cheung et al., Record Turnout for Hong Kong’s District Council Elections; Two Pan-Democratic
Big Guns Out, Three New Pro-Occupy Candidates Win, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 29, 2015),
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/1881914/polarised-voters-turn-out-record-numbershong-kongs-district.
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See Alice Wu, District Council Election Results Shatter Myth of Political Apathy in Hong Kong, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 29, 2015), http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1884113/district-council-election-results-shatter-myth-political.
151
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III. RECONCILING CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN
HONG KONG
Notwithstanding the value of civil disobedience in terms of civic education,
one relevant and unavoidable issue under the utilitarian approach concerns how
civil disobedience can be reconciled with the rule of law in Hong Kong.
A. Civil Disobedience vs. Rule of Law
In a modern, liberal society, it is generally accepted both that no one is above
the law and that no one has the right to break the law. Of course, this is not to
say that there are no circumstances under which people have a right to disobey
the law.153 In particular, when a law wrongly infringes on a person’s rights
against the government, that person has a right to disobey the law.154 However,
civil disobedience is not above the law; after all, people are “conscientious”
when engaging in breaching the law and willing to accept the legal consequence
of their unlawful acts, which clearly shows their overall “fidelity” to the law in
general (despite being at the outer edge thereof).155 Nonetheless, when
considered as a matter of fact, civil disobedience is against the law. When a
participant in civil disobedience states that he is above the law because of some
“moral standard,” he is in fact stating that democracy is beneath him, insofar as
the law is grounded in democracy as the legislative mechanism.156 In this regard,
his disobedience demonstrates a distrust for the democratic system. He is saying
that since democracy does not work, he can see no reason to help make it
work.157
Although the case of Hong Kong may be slightly different from similar cases
in liberal democracies, the intrinsic nature of disobedience against the law and
even democracy is no different. Hong Kong is, at the very least, a law-abiding
“thin” democracy, albeit one with some distinctive features.158 The government
of Hong Kong is divided into three usual branches.159 Apart from the Chief
Executive, which remains a significant departure from the democratic ideal,
Hong Kong’s legislative power is vested in the Legislative Council, which “shall
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RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 192 (1977).
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be constituted by election[s][,]”160 and “has 70 Members for the sixth term, with
35 Members returned by geographical constituencies through direct elections,
and 35 Members by functional constituencies.”161 There is free press and
freedom of speech, as well as a multitude of political parties.162 All of these are
requirements for democracy. In addition, the law of Hong Kong is based on the
rule of law and the independence of the judiciary.163
Overall, Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy. However, it does
not have its own sovereignty, which is claimed exclusively by China’s Central
Government.164 In principle, national laws are not applicable in Hong Kong, as
the highest law within the jurisdiction is the Hong Kong Basic Law.165
Therefore, whether protesters are pursuing certain aims by disobeying what they
consider to be an immoral law (direct civil disobedience), or even disobeying a
law they consider to be moral law to accomplish some other objective (indirect
civil disobedience), they are disrespecting the current semi-democratic system
and the rule of law.166 Similarly, they hold the belief that “the process for
democratic relief is too slow, that only mass confrontation can bring immediate
action, and that any injuries are the inevitable cost of the pursuit of justice. . . .
simply put, that the end justifies the means.”167 Of course, it would be possible
to argue for any illegal form of demonstration as a form of dissent in this way;
however, this threatens to destroy a society built on the rule of law, and could
lead to “serious disorder” that could “undermine the efficacy of the just
constitution.”168
If the rule of law is substantially threatened, this may be dangerous for
society, leading to a certain degree of anarchy or even totalitarianism. As John
Locke once wrote, “[w]her-ever law ends, tyranny begins,” and the people are
“absolved from any further obedience.”169 “Governments are dissolved from
within” when the legislative chamber is altered.170 When the government
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becomes “arbitrary disposers of lives, liberties, and fortunes of the people,”171
such revolutions happen.
It can be seen from the OCM and Anti-ELAB movements that, other than
some political dialogue, China has (pragmatically) made no formal response to
the demands of either the movement as a whole or the protesters involved.
Moreover, the OCM failed to achieve its aims, namely having the NPCSC
withdraw its decision and the government of Hong Kong relaunch the Five-Step
Process of Political Reform.172
Subsequently, the OCM actually prompted the Legislative Council to veto
the reform package.173 To a certain extent, this cast doubt on the effectiveness
of taking shortcuts to bypass democratic methods of petitioning, debating, and
assembling.174 Although the pressure imposed by the OCM may have been
legitimate to some extent, this type of pressure can easily become illegitimate if
it shakes people’s confidence in the rule of law, or even brings Hong Kong into
chaos. Arguably, the pressure applied by demonstrations is “desirable only if” it
takes place “within the limits allowed by [common] law” and also does not
subvert, or at least threaten, the rule of law system of Hong Kong.175 This is not
to say that civil disobedience can never be justified in the Hong Kong context;
in fact, given that Hong Kong has a liberal (albeit semi-democratic)
constitutional system, it is definitely possible that the people may resort to civil
disobedience after exhausting all other available measures of achieving justice,
particularly when the law has at some point become instrumental for the
government.176 For example, although the right to freedom of assembly and
association is a fundamental constitutional right in Hong Kong, it is possible that
the government might unconstitutionally restrict such a fundamental right
through refusing to grant a letter of no objection for a peaceful rally in the name
of public safety, or similar.177 In this situation, although a march may be labeled
171

Id. § 222.
THE SIX-MONTHLY REPORT ON HONG KONG 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 2015, FOREIGN &
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“unlawful” by the government, the state cannot deny people’s constitutional
right to march from a common law perspective.178
B. Civil Disobedience under China’s Authoritarian System
As China is an authoritarian state, it is understandable that, in general, there
was little to no hope that the OCM would bring about change with respect to a
political decision made by the Central Government. This can largely be ascribed
to the key characteristics of authoritarianism, which can typically be divided into
four components: (1) “limited, not responsible, political pluralism,” that is,
constraints on political institutions and groups (such as legislatures, political
parties and interest groups); (2) a basis for legitimacy based on emotion,
especially the identification of the regime as a necessary evil to combat easily
recognizable societal problems such as underdevelopment or insurgency; (3)
neither “extensive nor intensive political mobilization” and constraints on the
masses (such as repressive tactics against opponents and a prohibition on antiregime activity); and (4) “formally ill-defined” executive power, often shifting
or vague.179
Following the handover of Hong Kong to China, there has been no doubt
that, under the “One Country, Two Systems” principle, China has been able to
influence Hong Kong’s constitutional order in accordance with the Hong Kong
Basic Law.180 Although the Hong Kong Basic Law is sometimes considered a
“mini-constitution” within the jurisdiction, it was never voted on by the people
of Hong Kong, nor approved by them or their representatives; it was simply
adopted by the National People’s Congress in Beijing.181 According to Articles
158 and 159 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, the power to amend and interpret the
Basic Law is vested in the NPCSC, although the courts may also interpret other
provisions of the Basic Law when adjudicating cases.182 Although Article 45 of
the Hong Kong Basic Law states that the Chief Executive of Hong Kong “shall
178
In fact, during the anti-extradition protests in Yuen Long, the police issued a letter prohibiting the
protest, stating that “[w]e have reason to believe that the marchers will engage in physical confrontation with
villagers, and will pose a danger to marchers, villagers and other members of the public[;]” however, the government did not fully respond to the public demand for a full withdrawal of the extradition bill. For more details,
see Kris Cheng & Holmes Chan, Hong Kong Police Ban Saturday’s Yuen Long Protest Against Mob Attacks,
H. K. FREE PRESS (July 25, 2019), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/07/25/breaking-hong-kong-police-banyuen-long-protest-saturday/.
179
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be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed
by the Central People’s Government[,]” and that the ultimate aim was the
selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a
broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic
procedures, the NPCSC still has the complete authority to determine the specific
meaning of this Article.183 As a result, the NPCSC gave a detailed decision,
stipulating four requirements for the selection of the Chief Executive:
(1) A broadly representative nominating committee shall be formed.
The provisions for the number of members, composition and formation method of the nominating committee shall be made in accordance with the number of members, composition and formation method
of the Election Committee for the Fourth Chief Executive.
(2) The nominating committee shall nominate two to three candidates
for the office of Chief Executive in accordance with democratic procedures. Each candidate must have the endorsement of more than half
of all the members of the nominating committee.
(3) All eligible electors of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region have the right to vote in the election of the Chief Executive and
elect one of the candidates for the office of Chief Executive in accordance with law.
(4) The Chief Executive-elect, after being selected through universal
suffrage, will have to be appointed by the Central People’s Government.184

As has been pointed out by pro-democracy activists, this decision effectively
enables only Beijing-approved candidates to get through the nomination
process, since the members of the Election Committee for the Fourth Chief
Executive are only to be elected by functional constituencies.185 Furthermore, in
terms of the makeup of the selection committee, the sectors that were politically
closer to Beijing, such as traditional Chinese medicine, were over-represented
in proportion to their share of the population when compared to sectors deemed
hostile, such as social workers or lawyers.186 Purely from a legal perspective,
these regulations do not contravene the letter of the Hong Kong Basic Law.
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Nevertheless, the NPCSC made a highly restrictive interpretation of Article 45
and its relation to universal suffrage.187
In addition, procedurally speaking, according to the Hong Kong Basic Law
and the Interpretation of NPCSC in 2004, amendments to the election methods
for the Chief Executive were subject to a “Five-step Process”:
(1) The Chief Executive should report to the NPCSC and invite it to
decide whether any amendments to the selection method are necessary;
(2) The NPCSC should “make a determination on whether any amendment to the selection method may be made;”
(3) If the NPCSC determined that the method should be amended, the
Hong Kong Government should “introduce to the Legislative Council
(‘LegCo’) a resolution on the amendments to the method for selecting
the” Chief Executive and the method for forming the Legislative
Council, “to be passed by a two-thirds majority of all” Legislative
Council Members;
(4) The Chief Executive should “consent to the resolution as passed by
the LegCo;” and
(5) The Chief Executive should lodge the relevant bill “to the NPCSC
for approval” or for the record.188

On its face, these procedures are compatible with the basic “One Country,
Two Systems” principle.189 On the one hand, under China’s sovereignty and the
Hong Kong Basic Law, the NPCSC has the power to determine the meaning of
Article 45, even if that meaning is highly restrictive.190 As to the NPCSC’s
decision regarding the second step, the Legislative Council, as the representative
of the people of Hong Kong, can only choose not to pass the resolution
introduced by the government. In other words, regarding the democratic
development of Hong Kong, it is Beijing, rather than Hong Kong, that has the
decisive authority. Of course, as an authoritarian state, China will clearly act to
ensure that Hong Kong’s democratic development is not even an incremental
threat to its authority; this is because, geopolitically speaking, there is a fear that
any democratic developments in Hong Kong may eventually be appealing to the
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rest of China.191 Although the OCM may have brought to bear greater legitimate
pressure than was possible through standard channels, the long-term utility of
this pressure is questionable.192 Notwithstanding that the Legislative Council
voted against the NPCSC’s electoral system proposal, the NPCSC has yet to
respond with a framework that loosens Beijing’s control.193 Indeed, given the
authoritarian nature of the Chinese Central Government, particularly with
respect to the significant constraints placed on intensive or extensive political
mobilization on the mainland, mass public civil disobedience in Hong Kong
places the Central Government in a difficult position: in short, the Central
Government will likely wish to avoid granting concessions that could be
perceived as capitulation in the face of civil disobedience, as this would
ultimately pose a threat to its authority.194
In this regard, as discussed above, it would be strategically rational for Hong
Kong, if plausible, to reform or strengthen its democratic system from the inside,
and perhaps to resort sometimes to support from the international community
with common shared values. Moreover, if justified, civil disobedience is more
likely to impose substantial pressure on the Hong Kong government to respond
to the demand for justice within its domain of autonomy, rather than on the
external Beijing, which has no democratic accountability towards the people of
Hong Kong. Of course, although some affairs may fall within the autonomous
domain of Hong Kong’s government, given the principal-agent relationship
between the government of Hong Kong and the Central Government of China,
civil disobedience may be less likely to exert pressure on the government of
Hong Kong to make some pragmatic concessions if Beijing plays an implicit but
dominant role therein.195 For example, although the extradition bill was
proposed by the government of Hong Kong within its autonomous domain
according to Hong Kong Basic Law, the suspension of the bill, proposed by the
Chief Executive, was in fact agreed to by China’s Vice Premier Han in a closeddoor meeting before its announcement.196
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As evidenced by the OCM and the Anti-ELAB movement, there is no doubt
that large-scale disobedience, if staged appropriately, may favor pro-democracy
politics in District Council and Legislative Council elections within Hong Kong.
Nonetheless, to take an extreme example, if civil disobedience is making Hong
Kong chaotic or even causing it to substantially threaten China’s authoritarian
regime, such disobedience may actually spawn far more injustices than it
removes, including a further tightening of mainland control. Indeed, as Dusen
perceptively argued, “[i]f citizens rely on antidemocratic means of protest, they
will help bring about the undemocratic result of an authoritarian or anarchic
state.”197 Moreover, as Larry Diamond pointed out, that Hong Kong is not part
of Mainland China only means that the threshold at which Beijing will use
military or similar force to crack down on these protests is relatively high.198
Beijing may take some coercive measures, perhaps in some combination with
local ones, if the unending protests or defiance cross Beijing’s red line and
substantially challenge its authority or position.199
C. Reconciling Civil Disobedience
The question that therefore arises is how civil disobedience can be reconciled
with respect for the rule of law and democratic processes. Hall argued that a just
and stable society can in fact handle a modicum of unlawful civil disobedience,
provided that clear limitations are placed on the illegal conduct that is
permissible.200 As previously noted, this reconciliation requires that acts of civil
disobedience have underlying social value and take place non-violently, with a
minimum of force, and with respect for the rights and interests of others.201 More
precisely, “[u]nlike the rioter [who uses violence], the true civil disobedient
commits no violence. Unlike the mob demonstrator, he commits no trespass on
others’ rights.”202
In reconciling the rule of law and civil disobedience, it is also relevant to
emphasize that the rule of law in Hong Kong entails the constitutional protection
of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of demonstration by
virtue of Article 27 of the Basic Law.203 The “rule of law” may not entirely

197

Dusen, supra note 25, at 125.
See Li, supra note 191.
199
Id.
200
Matthew R. Hall, Guilty but Civilly Disobedient: Reconciling Civil Disobedience and the Rule of Law,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2083, 2095 (2007).
201
Id. at 2089.
202
Dusen, supra note 25, at 125.
203
XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 27 (H.K.).
198

WANG_2.9.21

52

2/10/2021 1:03 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

protect the civil disobedience that occurred during the OCM, but it does provide
some limited acceptability. Even so, the rights to freedom of expression and
assembly are not absolute, and restrictions may be permitted in the interests of
(amongst other matters) public safety, public order, and the protection of others’
rights and freedoms where the restriction is both (i) necessary and (ii) the least
intrusive means of protecting such interests under the circumstances.204
Proportionality considerations thus favor that individuals should exhaust all
reasonably available, effective, lawful, and democratic channels before resorting
to civil disobedience.205 Such channels include formal party participation,
lobbying of members of parliament, collective action mediated by both party
and electoral politics, and commencement of proceedings before courts under
the rule of law.206 In addition, proportionality considerations also strongly favor
the nonviolent exercise of constitutionally protected rights.207 Given that violent
acts threaten public order and public safety, and are also likely to infringe on the
individual rights of others (such as the right to security of person and property),
the exercise of such rights in the context of violent civil disobedience is likely
to be deemed disproportionate by a court.208 Moreover, the converse is also true:
in cases where civil disobedience is carried out in a nonviolent manner and
constitutes little threat to the social order, any limitations placed on participants’
rights to freedom of speech and assembly become less permissible.209 Indeed, as
previously noted, in the Public Light Bus case the Court of First Instance
emphasized in obiter dictum that violence is a factor when balancing rights and
interests.210 There, Judge Jeremy Poon noted that the disproportionately violent
nature of confrontations between the protesters and police during the OCM
meant that any of the protesters’ defenses, grounded in their fundamental rights
to freedom of assembly and demonstration, would be unlikely to succeed.211
From a strategic perspective, given that Hong Kong is a relatively fragile
semi-democracy under China’s authoritarian governance, civil disobedience—
204
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particularly if it involves inappropriate violence or other destructive measures,
such as property damage—is more likely to be counterproductive, as civil
disobedience is more likely to succeed when it engages in a patient and highly
coordinated program of continued, nonviolent protest aimed at mobilizing the
broadest possible support.212 Moreover, radicalism resulting from violence may
even provide pretext or justification for Beijing to intervene in Hong Kong’s
autonomous affairs, as under Article 14 of the Garrison Law of the People’s
Republic of China.213 This issue was mentioned by a spokesperson from China’s
Defense Ministry when asked by reporters how the Ministry planned to handle
Hong Kong’s “separatists.”214 The spokesperson stated that the Hong Kong
government may, if necessary, ask the central government for assistance, as the
People’s Liberation Army stationed in the city may be deployed for the
maintenance of public order or in cases of disaster relief.215
It is clear that most people possess a common-sense morality according to
which they may take defensive action against government agents who commit
injustice, in the same way that it may be considered justified to lie or even use
violence in self-defense or in defense of others when faced with a murderer at
the door. Although nonviolence should be a fundamental principle underpinning
civil disobedience, as Jason Brennan says, if peaceful methods fail to stop the
injustice, “[t]he common-law doctrine of self-defense is always governed by a
necessity proviso: you may lie or use violence only if . . . peaceful actions are
not as effective.”216 Although, according to Rawls, “any interference with the
civil liberties of others tends to obscure the civilly disobedient quality of one’s
act[,]”217 this should by no means be used to deny the possibility of a limited
form of violence that can be used strategically without losing its “civil” value;
for example, a limited form of violence that enhances the communicativeness
and publicity of one’s act.218
212
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Conceptually, it has been perceived that the distinction between violence and
nonviolence—along with the necessarily nonviolent character of civil forms of
contestation—may be politically instrumentalized, as it is more likely that the
government will “pursue a strategy of divide and rule with regard to protest by
portraying and celebrating certain forms of protest as good . . . and labelling and
repressing other forms of protest—often those of marginalized groups—as
violent, uncivil and criminal.”219 Meanwhile, “violence” may refer to either
physical (as traditionally understood) violence or psychological violence,
although the latter might be excluded under narrower definitions.220 By their
nature, both are a form of coercion.221 This dual nature means that a government
agency may take the form of coercion that is non-physical; for example,
regarding the anti-extradition bill protests, it has been argued “that the
protesters’ anger stems from the structural violence that Beijing has stealthily
inflicted on them over the past decade.”222
Accordingly, as John Morreall points out, if we entirely rule out all forms of
coercion in acts of civil disobedience, we may have gone too far, as we have
actually “ruled out the greater share of what has traditionally been called civil
disobedience, on the grounds that practically all of it has involved some form of
coercion.”223 In fact, even Rawls does not deny that “[s]ometimes[,] if the appeal
fails in its purpose, forceful resistance may later be entertained.”224
Because people tend to disapprove of violence in general, justifying the use
of violence, within a limited scope, if used as a tactic in an act of civil
disobedience will largely depend on how the public reacts to it, along with
whether it is able to have the proper effect on the public,225 as it gives voice to
“conscientious and deeply held convictions[.]”226 Interestingly, to a certain
extent, this has been evidenced by the triumph of pro-democratic forces in the
District Council election during the anti-extradition bill protests, which certainly
involved certain forms of violence, as mentioned above. Undoubtedly, the
limited violence deployed as a tactic in an act of civil disobedience must not aim
at seriously injuring or even killing other individuals, and those who engage in
civil disobedience should be both conscientious about the violence involved and
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willing to accept the punishment resulting from their unlawful and violent
acts.227
Overall, protesters who engage in any future civil disobedience in Hong
Kong must not only eschew violence at the outset of their actions but must also
assess their ability to remain peaceful given the reasonably foreseeable
consequences of their conduct. Arguably, where no threat of violence exists and
where particular regard is given to the value of permitting nonviolent acts of
civil disobedience in Hong Kong—insofar as civil disobedience plays a
fundamental, educative role in promoting the citizenry’s capacity to engage in
the political process—a balance can be more readily struck in favor of permitting
such acts. On the other hand, where civil disobedience is accompanied by
violence, such acts cannot be reconciled with the rule of law; this is particularly
true in the context of Hong Kong, where preservation of the rule of law and
Hong Kong’s autonomy within the “One Country, Two Systems” rubric is
paramount. In those instances, violent civil disobedience should be restricted as
far as possible, or even punished according to the law.
CONCLUSION
Based on the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, it was agreed that the
“One Country, Two Systems” framework would shape the future of Hong
Kong.228 As a consequence, Hong Kong has formed and developed a distinctive
semi-democratic system with judicial independence under China’s authoritarian
system, as is currently enforced by the Hong Kong Basic Law.229 Although
China has claimed its sovereignty over Hong Kong, under the “One Country,
Two Systems” principle Hong Kong has been allowed to enjoy far greater
autonomy than any other Chinese territory. In a civilized society built on the rule
of law, all available legal and democratic channels should be used, if necessary,
to create social change.230 Hong Kong’s legal system guarantees a wide variety
of opportunities to use mass meetings, public parades, and organized
demonstrations to stoke public sentiment, characterize issues, and cause
change.231
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Although civil disobedience may be justified under certain circumstances,
the threshold of injustice as a trigger for civil disobedience is usually high.232 It
must always be borne in mind that:
[T]he greatest danger in condoning civil disobedience as a permissible
strategy for hastening change is that it undermines our democratic processes. To adopt the techniques of civil disobedience is to assume that
representative government does not work. To resist the decisions of
courts and the laws of elected assemblies is to say that democracy has
failed.233

Dusen provided examples to illustrate his view of the true nature of civil
disobedience:
When militant students storm a college president’s office to achieve
demands, when certain groups plan rush-hour car stalling to protest
discrimination in employment, these are not dissent, but a denial of
rights to others. Neither is it the lawful use of mass protest, but rather
the unlawful use of mob power.234

Nonetheless, this does not deny that the people of Hong Kong may be
prevented from self-legislating effectively due to the shortcomings of Hong
Kong’s semi-democratic system. Civil disobedience—as an integral part of any
democratic society with institutional defects—can be considered not only as a
transitory response under extreme circumstances, but also as a democratizing
force to initiate and reopen deliberations. This is especially true when people
face the “failures of government to debate or enact important policy options,
where the discussion or enactment of those options is obstructed by the
phenomenon of deliberative inertia[,]”235 or even authoritarian tendency. Just as
Hannah Arendt says, mass civil disobedience is inevitable in unstable political
circumstances and can ultimately equilibrate and stabilize society.236 It “enables
the reenactment of the horizontal social contract between the people through an
eruption of ‘civic freedom’ and ‘public happiness’, thus strengthening civic
bonds and invigorating the public sphere.”237
Specifically, regarding Hong Kong’s semi-democracy under China’s
authoritarian system, the above analysis suggests that the OCM was largely
232
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misplaced in Hong Kong, as the protesters attempted to pressure China’s Central
Government despite its lack of democratic accountability to the people of Hong
Kong.238 The strategy of pressuring the Central Government to withdraw its
proposed electoral framework largely ignored the fact that Hong Kong’s host
country is an authoritarian state, which has not previously been responsive to
civil disobedience in a way that would be typical of a liberal democracy.
Nonetheless, the movement did transgress the just laws of Hong Kong.239 This
was particularly concerning due to its potential to undermine the rule of law and
encourage lawlessness, as was evident during the latter stages of the OCM,
which involved many incidents of violence.240 By contrast, during the antiextradition bill protests, the civil disobedience may have been pragmatically
appropriate under the “One Country, Two Systems” principle as it was placing
pressure on the government of Hong Kong, which is at least somewhat
responsive to the people of Hong Kong under its current semi-democratic
system.241 In effect, the Hong Kong government, which proposed the bill within
its domain of autonomy, did make some concessions in its move to withdraw
the extradition bill, in contrast to the lack of concessions made during the
OCM.242 Retrospectively, the organizers of the OCM once claimed that civil
disobedience would be the most lethal weapon available to the Hong Kong
people in their struggle for democracy.243 However, the concern remains that
under the framework of “One Country, Two Systems,” the outcome of the OCM
could prove less of a weapon against the Central People’s Government, and
more likely a weapon against Hong Kong itself concerning the sacrifice of its
rule of law if the strategy is not adopted appropriately.
Although the OCM did not achieve its goals pragmatically, this is not to say
that people should refrain from civil disobedience in the face of an authoritarian
regime.244 Rather, Hong Kong, as a civilized rule-of-law region under the “One
Country, Two Systems” framework, should be concerned with maintaining and
238
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fostering its core value of the rule of law and making use of all legally available
channels to fight for justice. Otherwise, under China’s authoritarian system,
Hong Kong may lose its most basic characteristic: the rule of law. It could then
degenerate into a less democratic region and rapidly become semiauthoritarian.245
Notwithstanding these concerns, the fact remains that Hong Kong still has a
long tradition of public protest.246 The OCM and those involved in the AntiELAB movement have proven particularly significant for Hongkongers as civic
education tools that encourage political engagement, as evidenced by record
turnouts in Hong Kong’s district council elections and the subsequent election
of the “Umbrella Soldiers.”247 Indeed, notwithstanding the level of autonomy
enjoyed by Hong Kong under “One Country, Two Systems,” certain limitations
placed on its democratic institutions by the Hong Kong Basic Law make the
maintenance and development of its liberal traditions an ongoing difficulty.248
In the face of China’s authoritarian sovereign power, the risk is that
democratic consciousness may wane if robust public protest is not maintained.
Thus, in order to reconcile the costs and benefits of civil disobedience in Hong
Kong, the absence of violence becomes a fundamental condition. In cases where
civil disobedience proceeds peacefully, its civic education benefits are more
readily justified, and arguably provide greater support for a judicial approach
that favors upholding the fundamental rights that underpin an individual’s
participation in civil disobedience (such as freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly).249 By contrast, where civil disobedience involves illegal acts of
violence, it can hardly be justified. An even worse outcome would be one in
which the citizens engage in violence or chaotic behavior, crossing Beijing’s
bottom line, with the result that the mainland government takes coercive
measures to maintain the “One Country, Two Systems” principle, perhaps in the
name of “state sovereignty” or “national security.” Of course, this should by no
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means be used to exclude the possibility that limited forms of violence may be
strategically and appropriately used as tactics in civil disobedience.
It is worth noting that after Hong Kong’s National Security Law (NSL) was
enacted by the NPCSC in June 2020, it has become very clear that China cannot
tolerate any acts involving potential secession, subversion, terrorism, and/or
collusion with foreign powers, all of which have been criminalized by the
NSL.250 More specifically, in addition to the new Hong Kong national security
body established under the NSL (the Committee for Safeguarding National
Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, or HKNSC), the
Central People’s Government has also established another new office in Hong
Kong, the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s
Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (CPGNSO),
which is not subject to Hong Kong’s jurisdiction.251 According to Article 55 of
the NSL, the CPGNSO has exclusive jurisdiction over a case:
[C]oncerning offence endangering national security under [the NSL],
if: (1) the case is complex due to the involvement of a foreign country
or external elements, thus making it difficult for the Region to exercise
jurisdiction over the case; (2) a serious situation occurs where the Government of the Region is unable to effectively enforce [the NSL]; or
(3) a major and imminent threat to national security has occurred.252

When a case arises concerning an offense believed to endanger national
security pursuant to Article 55 of the NSL, the CPGNSO, rather than the Hong
Kong authorities, shall initiate investigation into the case, which will
subsequently fall under the jurisdiction of the prosecutors and courts in
Mainland China;253 furthermore, the decision made by the HKNSC cannot be
amended via Hong Kong’s judicial review.254 From a legal perspective,
moreover, the definitions of these crimes as listed in the NSL are somewhat
ambiguous255 and open to broad interpretation, where such interpretative power
is vested in the NPCSC according to the NSL.256 Given the status of Hong Kong
as a common law jurisdiction under “One Country, Two Systems,” this does not
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technically prohibit Hong Kong courts from developing a common law
jurisprudence by interpreting the NSL when handling such cases.257 Having said
this, in terms of civil disobedience within Hong Kong, the NSL clearly provides
both China and the pro-Beijing government of Hong Kong with a legal channel
to exercise a wide range of discretion when handling a case suspected to involve
NSL-listed crimes.258 If the case involves openly advocating for the overthrow
of the Chinese government under CCP’s leadership or calling for Hong Kong’s
independence, it will very likely be treated as a national security case by the
government.259
It is clear that one consequence of passing the NSL has been a certain
intimidating effect on Hong Kong’s human rights advocates.260 A number of
pro-democracy political organizations once run by activists for democracy have
ceased operating since the NSL came into effect, while some prominent political
activists have fled Hong Kong to escape the potential dangers posed by the
NSL.261 Of course, this is not to say that people have surrendered to fear since
the NSL was enacted, although fear may certainly be used by politicians as a
tool to change people’s attitudes and behaviors.262 On the contrary, there is
strong evidence that people are still searching for new means of resisting
authoritarian rule.263 One example of this involves the unprecedented support
expressed by investors of Jimmy Lai, who was arrested under the NSL;
following his arrest, investors bought shares in the company he owned, causing
the stock value to rise more than 2,000% to a twelve-year high.264 Another
example concerns the long queues of people lining up to purchase the antigovernment tabloid Apple Daily in the early hours of the day immediately after
the arrest.265 More than half a million copies of the paper were published that
day, a significant increase from the usual 100,000.266 Of course, given that the
governments of both Hong Kong and China have been granted a wide range of
discretion in applying the NSL, it seems very likely that there is almost no space
257
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for any large-scale civil disobedience involving illegal acts of violence, as such
activities could easily be categorized as crimes under the NSL.267 Despite this,
there is undoubtedly still hope given Hong Kong’s unflagging spirit of
resistance.
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